This paper examines cross domain deterrence strategies involving cyber incidents. By focusing on efforts to halt Russian and Chinese cyber operations against the United States this paper examines the importance of developing, maintaining and implementing (when necessary) cross domain deterrence strategies. This paper departs from more theoretic debates on the value and potential success, or lack thereof relating to cyber deterrence strategies and focuses on two cases in which cross domain retaliations were utilized to halt adversary behavior. From these two cases this paper posits a preliminary theory of cross domain deterrence applicable to cyber interactions between states and advances the debates in the field by shifting the center of gravity away from within domain responses to other mechanisms to deter adversary behavior.
Deterrence mechanisms can be broken down in a variety of different ways, three of which stand out in research on cyberspace. The first and most commonly analyzed form of deterrence is deterrence by threats of punishment. engages in an action or behavior it will suffer costs imposed by the deterring state. A second form of deterrence commonly analyzed in relation to cyberspace actions and behaviors is deterrence by denial. 9 Deterrence by denial creates conditions under which an actor is dissuaded by ex-ante costs associated with engaging in certain behaviors or actions. Joseph Nye further added to the debate on deterrence mechanisms by indicating that states could be entangled in such a manner so as to foster "self-deterrence". Deterrence by entanglement occurs when the deterrer and the attacker come to a consensus that the benefits sought by the attacker will result in self-imposed costs in excess of expected gains.
For the purpose of studying the impact of CDD on adversary behavior in cyberspace the analysis below is constrained to CDD mechanisms emphasizing deterrence by threats of punishment. While it is conceivable to extend CDD to denial and entanglement strategies that is beyond the scope of this chapter. Furthermore, deterrence by punishment offers a level of simplicity in an actionreaction pairing that simplifies analysis on a range of associated issues.
All forms of deterrence require clear signaling of both warnings and consequences. 10 The absence of clarity in warnings creates a situation in which adversaries are unable to identify redlines and will "probe" the resolve of the deterring state to determine where those red lines exist. Public or private declarations about what will or will not be tolerated and continuing to reinforce and convey the boundaries of acceptable behavior or actions informs the rational decision-making calculus of an adversary. Clearly signaling consequences increases the level of mutual information about costs and potential benefits between an attacker and deterrer. Clear signaling of costs further fills out the rational decision-making calculus of an adversary and establishes the foundation for deterrence by threats of punishment. Clarity requires specificity. Specificity is the identification of what and potentially why and how targets (or categories of targets) might be attacked by an adversary.
Specificity of both targets and means that would result in the actuation of a punishment strategy provides information to adversaries about where red lines are and how they can be triggered.
Furthermore, specificity also includes the identification of where, what, why and how costs will 9 Brantly, Aaron F. 2018 "The Cyber Deterrence Problem." In The 10 th International Conference on Cyber Conflict. Tallinn: NATO Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. 31-54. 10 George, Alexander L, and Richard Smoke. 1974 . Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. New York: Columbia University Press.
be imposed in response to clearly identified behaviors or actions undertaken by an attacker. Both clarity and specificity inform the decision-making calculus of adversaries and offer a potential avenue for mitigating escalatory actions when a punishment is being exacted in response to a violation.
Beyond clearly and specifically signaling both warnings and consequences, it is necessary for states to ensure these signals are credible.
11 As stated by Jon Lindsay and Erik Gartzke:
"Deterrence is also an information problem as defenders seek to generate credible signals of resolve and intent for challengers". 12 Insufficient credibility weakens signals and creates information imbalances within a rational deterrence calculus. As will be discussed below credibility is a challenging problem for both conventional within domain deterrence in cyberspace and for CDD. Credibility is both offensive and defensive in nature. Simply possessing the power to punish does not indicate the ability to punish accurately. Responding to kinetic attacks requires radar, sonar, or other detection systems that can provide sufficient evidence to indicate the perpetrator of a given attack. Similarly, to respond to a cyber-attack also requires sufficient defensive capabilities to provide reasonable attribution within a timely manner.
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Often in discussions on deterrence emphasis is placed on the credible development of means of punishment. While in the kinetic realm, such means can be accomplished through the acquisition of missiles, planes, tanks or other kinetic devices, each of which clearly demonstrates an approximate level of response capability, similar demonstrations in cyberspace are far more difficult to achieve but are equally necessary. It is not credible to say that in response to a cyberattack a state will threaten via cyberspace to attack a comparable (i.e. proportionate target). Such attacks take time and effort to establish and require sufficient intelligence preparation of the battlefield. 14 Whereas in the kinetic sense it is more reasonable to say, "if you bomb my power plant, I will bomb your power plant," in cyberspace saying, "if you hack my power plant, I will proportionate costs on an attacker or violator of the established status quo within a deterrence framework. The most common concern associated with deterrence is not that an adversary receives the same punishment in return for the costs that it caused to the state it attacked. Rather, the objective is to meet out a proportionate response to the costs incurred. 21 The concept known as jus ad bellum constrains states and attempts to limit punishments and reprisals to violations of international law. Too often in discussions of deterrence scholars and practitioners artificially constrain punishment strategies to equivalencies rather than proportionalities. This equivalency fallacy is due largely to the study of nuclear deterrence.
Nuclear deterrence is unique in the field of deterrence studies. It is unique for a variety of reasons. analytical skill, and organizational coordination…" 33 Lindsay further rightly identifies that despite the attribution problem being really hard to solve -it is most difficult in less vital instances of attack than it is in comparably important instances in which the amount of available information from both forensic and non-forensic (geo-political) means increases. Martin Libicki goes on to note in the context of a credible deterrence attribution is important. 34 The absence of accurate and reasonably substantiated attribution can lead to unnecessary escalation and retaliation against a third-party actor who did not perpetrate a cyber-attack. A response predicated on faulty attribution or based on attribution with insufficient evidence would constitute a new wrongful cyber act and consequently be in violation of international law.
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Third, the calibration of a proportionate response to a cyber-attack is confounded by several factors including, temporal constraints, cognitive perceptions of proportionality, and technical capacity to respond in kind. As identified above, the time to recognition that an attack is underway or has taken place is almost 200 days. Moreover, the time to contain such an attack is 60 days. Such an action-reaction delay in deterrence by punishment weakens the credibility associated with threats of punishment. If a state waits 6 months to respond to a conventional kinetic attack much less a nuclear attack credibility of punishment would be almost entirely lost. Even following 9/11 it only took the United States a few weeks to have the first CIA and special forces on the ground engaging in retaliatory actions against the Taliban and Al'Qaeda. Time is a critical component of deterrence at any level from punishing a criminal within a "statute of limitations" to punishing states to violate a red line. Calibrating the timing of the attack and the subsequent reception of that attack by an adversary so that they know they are being punished in a timely fashion in cyberspace alone is difficult. If a retaliation through cyberspace occurs but the state being punished doesn't recognize it has been attacked for more than 200 days, it is uncertain whether the punishment is in response to a violation of a stated red line or if it is itself a new attack. Calibrating a response within a timely manner is critical to the establishment of credible deterrence. 33 Lindsay, Jon R. Beyond the calibration of the timing of a punishment is the proportionality of a punishment such that it fits within the law of armed conflict and minimizes the likelihood of escalation. Stephen
Lukasik writes "while response to a cyber attack does not need to be a cyber counter-attack, international principles of armed conflict speak to proportionality of response and escalation control favors responding in kind." 36 Attacks that occur in the kinetic physical world are perceived fundamentally differently than those experienced in and through cyberspace. No one makes the perception argument more clearly than Thomas Rid, who through a Clausewitzian interpretation, finds that most cyber-attacks lack the attribute of violence that correlates with acts of war.
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Because of the "perception problem" states that cross domains to retaliate are likely to be perceived as escalating.
Although both timing and perceptions both constrain proportional responses, likely nothing more effectively constrains, deterrence by punishment in cyberspace than readily available technical capacity to engage in a proportional response. The development timeline for cyber capabilities available and applicable for achieving proportional effects against an adversary for the purpose of punishment requires substantial planning and foresight. Rebecca Slayton notes in her analysis of the development of the Stuxnet worm a lengthy timeline requiring the technical skills of programmers, nuclear engineers, security and intelligence professionals. 38 The development of code capable of punishing an adversary does not occur overnight. Even if the appropriate skillsets are brought together to create a capability able to punish an adversary in response for a cyberattack, such a capability must still be delivered to an appropriate target within a timely manner.
And as noted by Max Smeets, the shelf-life of cyber capabilities is limited. 39 The same challenges are not present in kinetic forms of punishment because as noted in a speech by Stanley Baldwin before Parliament in 1932, "the bomber will always get through." Despite being hyperbolic, the reality remains that kinetic weapons are comparatively easy to leverage for punishment because they are readily available and difficult to defend against in most instances. These core within domain response challenges elevate the applicability of CDD as a means of punishment. Despite a perception that CDD from cyber to conventional attacks is inherently escalatory, this need not be the reality in cyberspace and it is not the reality in conventional deterrence. In nearly every case in which the United States has engaged in deterrence it has leveraged all or many of the tools of state at its disposal. In response to the positioning of Nuclear missiles on Cuba, the United States engaged in a quarantine (blockade) of the island. In Iraq in 1991 the United States used combined land, air, and naval forces to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
In response to consistent provocations including the development of nuclear weapons by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) the United States employed diplomatic and economic sanctions to impose costs. Even in instances of espionage, the United States has played its hand strategically. For instance, when 10 Russian spies were discovered in the United States they were traded for four former US spies. While not deterrence per say, the incident shows that the capture and threat of punishment can be turned to a strategic or tactical advantage.
The United States is not alone in its use of cross-domain strategies. In response to amphibious landings by Argentine during the Falklands war, the United Kingdom utilized, land, sea, and air power to expel the Argentine forces and restore British rule. In each of these cases the act of punishment while proportionate to the violation did not lead to extended wars with the parties involved and at times led to a resolution within a short timeframe. Not all instances of crossdomain retaliation result in a limited escalation as evidenced by U.S. involvement in Vietnam, but there are ample cases where the limited use of a proportionate cross domain response resulted in an intended effect of altering the behavior of an adversary through the imposition of costs.
Despite the ability of proportionate cross domain retaliation to impose costs in many instances, George and Smoke note three main typologies that result in deterrence failure. 40 First, the absence of credible deterrent threat. In situations where an insufficient deterrence threat is present the attacking party will suffer no consequences and therefore will rationally conclude it will benefit reveals that while many cyber-attacks are painful in terms of lost intelligence, temporary losses in the availability of systems and the moderate degradation of command and control, few if any attacks have been substantial enough to warrant retaliation. The attacks that were substantial enough to warrant retaliation were targeted against states that possessed insufficient capacity to do so. 43 Three attacks stand out. First, the non-state cyber-attacks against the Republic of Georgia prior to and during armed hostilities with the Russian Federation in 2008. 44 Second, the Stuxnet attack, likely initiated by the United States and Israel against Iran's nuclear facilities at Natanz. 45 And third, the two black energy attacks carried out by the Russian Federation against the Ukrainian electric infrastructures in both the Western and central portions of the country. 46 In all three cases the victims of the attacks had insufficient capabilities to respond to cyber-attacks against the aggressor nation(s) or their proxies. In two of the three cases of substantial cyber-attacks the victims still possess insufficient conventional or cyber capacity to respond. Iran by contrast has spent substantial resources developing a moderate capability to respond and has demonstrated its increasing ability to respond in cyberspace with attacks against a variety of private sector entities including the Sands Casino in Las Vegas, a small spillway dam in New York, and Saudi Aramco. 47 Despite developing capabilities to respond, in each case the level of attacks subsequently perpetrated by Iran failed to rise to a level necessary to trigger a proportional counter response by the United States or other affected parties.
Most cyber-attacks exist below the threshold necessary to trigger punishment. 48 The effect is that although no single attack is able to induce sufficient pain necessary to trigger retaliation, attacks by a single actor cumulatively constitute a campaign that should or rather -could warrant a retaliatory response. Uri Tor notes that the manner in which many countries, the U.S. included understand and interpret deterrence is as an absolute. 49 For attacks to trigger retaliation under a premise of absolute deterrence they must necessarily exceed a threshold above which counter actions by the attacked party are justified. As is noted both in through historical case analysis and empirical analysis by Brandon Valeriano and Ryan Maness such a threshold is not common. U.S. deterrence in cyberspace has been hamstrung by an over-reliance on models of absolute deterrence designed to prevent strategic loss within a nuclear context. Although the policy and strategic documents have stated deterrence can and should be multi-domain, the reality has been that cyber-attacks have tended to be viewed as discrete incidents insufficient to trigger retaliation. violations. Combined, CDD offers a readily understood strategy already being utilized nearly all other instances of deterrence by punishment below the nuclear threshold.
CDD Efforts Against China and Their Effects
Chinese information warfare strategy can date its modern roots to the 1998 publication of Sphere that is cyberspace, but to mold it both domestically for its national interests as well as
Internationally in governance. The identification of information technology as critical to national development coincided and paralleled developments in China's economic policies, most notably its notion of a "Peaceful Rise". 58 Although China's ambition was a "Peaceful Rise" its timing indicated that such a rise would be rapid and disruptive. At the beginning of its informatization China lacked the human capital necessary to achieve its aspirations and therefore began a crash companies and individuals who have benefited from their government's cybertheft of valuable U.S. trade secrets". 70 In response to reports of purported sanctions China sent an advance delegation to seek out and negotiate with US officials to prevent the implementation of sanctions. 71 One week prior to the Xi -Obama summit president Obama was quoted as saying: "We are preparing a number of measures that will indicate to the Chinese that this is not just a matter of us being mildly upset, but is something that will put significant strains on the bilateral relationship if not resolved". 80 The leaks of emails also followed reports that the DNC's database of opposition research was also stolen. 81 Beyond hacking attempts against the DNC, Russian linked hackers also targeted key staff within the Hillary Clinton 2016 Presidential Campaign. Senior campaign staffers were sent phishing emails (spoof emails designed to social engineer the recipient into divulging login information).
Campaign Chairman John Podesta, after attempting due diligence with campaign IT staff fell victim to the Phishing campaign and subsequently had more than 50,000 emails stolen, of which 20,000 were released by Wikileaks. 82 Cybersecurity firm Crowdstrike in a series of blog posts and reports pointed the finger towards two different hacking organizations it identified as being affiliated with the Russian SVR (Foreign Intelligence Server) and the GRU (Russian Military Intelligence). 83 Crowdstrike subsequently named these two actor groups Cozy Bear (or Cozy Duke) APT 28 and Fancy Bear (Sofacy) APT 29. 84 Crowdstrike's initial findings have been largely supported by other cybersecurity firms and by the Intelligence community. 85 Beyond hacking the campaigns, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) contacted election officials in 21 states to notify them they have been the targets of Russian government hackers. 86 DHS alerted election officials that Russian hackers were trying to hack both voter registration files and public election sites.
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In addition to the targeted information campaigns via social media, the theft of emails and their subsequent distribution via Wikileaks, Russian hackers register and launch websites including DCLeaks.com which further distributed stolen emails and documents while purporting to be run by Americans. These websites were implicated in further distorting the information environment.
In summation, for more than two years with increasing intensity Russian linked organizations both private, the IRA, and governmental, SVR and GRU, were heavily involved in efforts to attack the integrity of the US Electoral process at multiple different levels, ranging from the information environment, to the political parties and potentially to the voting systems themselves. 93 These renewed efforts indicate a failure of U.S. retaliatory actions to sufficiently deter future hostile actions by the Russian Federation.
The case of Russian meddling in U.S. elections also does not meet the necessary prerequisites of armed attack or use of force. Yet the potential destructiveness of the meddling is readily apparent.
As in the case of Chinese cyberespionage attempts at retaliation were cross domain and again emphasized diplomatic and economic mechanisms. Yet, the Russian case differs from the Chinese case in several respects. First, it was time sensitive in that efforts to forestall meddling needed to be in effect prior to the 2016 Presidential elections. Only when the threats prior to election failed were retaliatory actions undertaken. These post-hoc retaliatory efforts were too late and were akin to shutting the fence after all the cows already left the pasture. Second, the scale of threat and retaliation relative to the actor was insufficient to deter and the inconsistency of policy between administrations has weakened the signals being sent to the Russian Federation about the continued resolve of the United States relating to election meddling. Simply making noise about the meddling without any true consequence for the meddler does not result in deterrence.
Discussion
In neither the case of sustained Chinese espionage nor Russian interference in the 2016 election did any single act perpetrated by an adversary rise to a level equivalent to the use of force or an armed attack. Yet, in both instances the United States, with divergent effects was able to develop a CDD strategy to counter adversary behavior. In both instances within markedly different timelines the United States interpreted discrete incidents cumulatively and attempted to aggregate the incidents and propose that both the United States and the perpetrator view the acts as constituting a violation of acceptable behavior warranting a retaliatory response. In both incidents while counter-cyber operations were proposed, the overt signal sent to the adversary was via threats of a diplomatic and economic nature. In both cases the U.S. government only substantially engaged in deterrent behavior in response to cumulatively interpreted cyber actions after private sector actors publicly brought forth substantial forensic and contextual evidence indicating the perpetrators of the violation. In both cases the United States viewed retaliatory threats as one-time events and failed to maintain or continue to develop potential mechanisms to pressure the adversary state. This tactic assumes immediate rather than iterated learning, something which is not supported by the literature. 94 Such a tactic is consistent with nuclear deterrence literatures in which the resultant retaliation imposes costs so substantial that further costs are unable to be imposed. Such a tactic is ill-suited to iterative learning in restrictive deterrence environments such as those identified by Tor.
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In both cases the challenge of responding to cyber-attacks in a timely fashion arises. Whereas the continuous cyberespionage activities of the Chinese necessitate a response, the response had no temporal constraints. The development of a CDD strategy targeted to specifics of the adversary and the threat posed allowed the Obama administration to build a suite of deterrence measures to effectively retaliate against China. The detailed analysis by the United States Government and private actors of a multitude of cyber-attacks combined with indictments, and the threat of severe and well-time sanctions to signal and achieve an impact reduced certain types of behaviors. In contrast to the CDD retaliations against China, the timeframe available to the United States to respond to the information warfare and cyber activities of the Russian Federation against the electoral processes of the United States was severely constrained. The constrained timeline necessitated rushed forensic and contextual analysis, furthermore the impact of the attacks was uncertain as opposed to the clear impact of sustained cyberespionage and theft. Both the shortened timeline and uncertain impact made timely decisions on potential deterrence strategies difficult.
Moreover, domestic politics surrounding the election constrained the Obama administration's options for pre-election response and limited the impact of post-election response.
Conclusion
CDD strategies are not a silver bullet solution to the challenges presented by adversaries in cyberspace. What is clear however, is that based on the available evidence both within cyberspace and beyond is that artificially constraining deterrence strategies that seek to punish actors for cyber-attacks to retaliations occurring in and through cyberspace is inefficient and impractical.
Just as a state wouldn't constrain itself to respond through equivalencies in other domains it should not seek to constrain itself within cyberspace. Moreover, the evidence to date indicates that strategies of CDD in cyberspace as in other domains below the nuclear threshold should not be absolute, but rather restrictive through iterative retaliatory mechanisms consistently assessed and modified to achieve a proportional response capable of altering an adversary's rational decisionmaking calculus. Yet even with all the considerations that support and highlight the potential effectiveness of CDD for providing a framework for deterring cyber-attacks, it is likely to take time to calibrate CDD to the actors a state such as the United States seeks to deter.
